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I. INTRODUCTION
A patent is a grant to exclude others from making, using,
or selling a claimed invention without the patent holder's per-
mission.' The patent holder has the right to bring a civil action
when she believes her patent has been infringed.2 Defining
the limits of a patent holder's right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention, however, has
proved to be a formidable task. Early in American patent his-
tory, an equitable doctrine was established to provide a patent
holder with a remedy against items that were practically, but
not quite exactly, identical to the claimed invention.' This has
become known as the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of
equivalents method evaluates whether an item infringes on a
patent when it is not precisely covered by the express language
of the patent but is substantially the same.
The equitable nature underlying the doctrine of
equivalents can be illustrated by a simple example. Imagine a
world without paper clips of any sort. One day our hero, John
Clip, while idly sitting at his desk, wraps a short length of wire
around an eraser. The wire eventually drops from the eraser
next to a stack of paper catching several pages together and
Eureka! the paper clip is invented. Mr. Clip's patent claim
reads: "I claim-A non-invasive paper fastening device com-
prising a piece of metal wire having three 180 U-bends, said
bends all lying in a single geometric plane."
* B.S.M.E. 1985, Michigan Technological University; J.D. Candidate 1993,
University of Puget Sound School of Law. The Author wishes to thank Adjunct
Professor Steven P. Koda for encouraging the study of this topic and reviewing early
drafts.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
2. Id. § 281.
3. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854); Park v. Little, 18 F.
Cas. 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 10,715); Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
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Much to his distress, Mr. Clip's financial success from the
paper clip is undermined by Ms. Shiphty who, appreciating the
commercial potential of the paper clip, sets out to manufacture
an imitation that just avoids the patent claim language. She
flanges the ends of the paper clip outward slightly, thus avoid-
ing the "one plane" limitation of the patent. Mr. Clip cannot
argue that Ms. Shiphty's device is exactly what he claimed
because, in patent parlance, her device does not "read on" his
patent.4 Mr. Clip's right to exclude is so narrow that he will
lose the benefit of his invention because Ms. Shiphty margin-
ally circumvents the patent claim's express language. The doc-
trine of equivalents attempts to avoid such abuse of patent
rights.
5
Despite the obvious inequities involved in this example,
the edges of the doctrine of equivalents are defined by closer
cases, and the doctrine is frequently clarified by the Federal
Circuit.' Among the more recent decisions attempting to clar-
ify application of the doctrine of equivalents is Wilson Sport-
ing Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assocs.7 Wilson proposed that
a court evaluating infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents should conceive a hypothetical version of the pat-
ent at issue, which expands the patent claim enough so that
the allegedly infringing device reads on the patent claim.' If
this expanded version of the claim would also cover prior art,9
4. A device is said to "read on" a patent if every element in the patent is present
in the device. A device that reads on a patent is said to literally infringe a patent.
Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 281 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir.
1991) ("It is only when the changes are so insubstantial as to result in 'a fraud on the
patent' that application of the equitable doctrine of equivalents becomes desirable.").
See also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TEcHNOLOGY 1-3
(1966) (stating that the patent system encourages expenditures of time and private risk
capital in research and development and encourages early public disclosure of
technological information).
6. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the thirteenth court of appeals
and was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Priv. L. No. 97-164,
96 Stat. 25 (1982). The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is determined by subject matter
rather than by region and includes patent cases. 28 U.S.C.A. § 195(a) (1988). Congress
formed the Federal Circuit mainly to unify judicial standards in patent cases.
7. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 281 (1991).
8. Id. at 684.
9. "Prior art" is a term of art that would probably be better understood today if
one thought of it as meaning "existing technology." One of the basic conditions for
patentability is that a person may not patent an item that would be obvious to someone
who is an expert in the field after that person considered existing technology. 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Prior art includes the relevant teachings and technologies that the
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the doctrine of equivalents would be stretched too far to find
infringement. This hypothetical technique for evaluating the
effect of prior art on any doctrine of equivalents infringement
has been useful,10 but the hypothetical could be even more
useful.
Accordingly, the purpose of this Comment is twofold:
first, to bring the reader up-to-date on the doctrine of
equivalents, and second, to suggest an improvement on the doc-
trine's application that is consistent with recent developments.
This Comment proposes that the hypothetical technique
should be expanded to evaluate more than prior art alone.
Before exploring how this new use of the hypothetical would
work, however, it is necessary to explain the doctrine of
equivalents' history, the factors that affect the range of
equivalents, and the methods to determine and apply
equivalents.
II. ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The doctrine of equivalents appeared in the United States
over one hundred years ago," and the United States Supreme
Court first applied the doctrine in Winans v. Denmead.12 In
that case, the Court held that the infringer's octagonal-shaped
coal car was equivalent to the patented cone-shaped coal car
because it performed the same novel functions as the patented
car even though it did not literally infringe on the patent
claims.1 3 The dissent in Winans, however, feared that to allow
a finding of infringement where the allegedly infringing item
does not read on the patent, but misappropriates the underly-
ing idea, would be to cause judicial unpredictability.
4
While Winans marked the Court's legitimization of the
patent office could look to rejecting a patent application for lack of novelty or
obviousness. See Hazeltin Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
10. See, e.g., Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 281 (1992); Key Mfg. v. Microdot, 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But see
International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg., 1993 U.S. APP. LEXIS 8017, *8 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (rejecting a trial court's misapplication of the hypothetical method).
11. See Park v. Little, 18 F. Cas. 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 10,715); Odiorne v.
Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
12. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854).
13. Id. at 341, 344.
14. Id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting) ("Nothing, in the administration of this
law, will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of
exorbitant and unjust pretensions and vexatious demands, more injurious to labor,
than a relaxation of these wise and salutary requisitions of the act of Congress.").
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doctrine of equivalents, the Court's most noted application of
the doctrine was in Graver Tank & Manufacturing v. Linde
Air Products Co. 15  In that case, the Court evaluated the
alleged infringement of a patent for a welding flux." The pat-
ent at issue claimed a combination of materials including mag-
nesium. The allegedly infringing welding flux was identical to
the patented flux except that manganese was used in place of
magnesium.' 7 The Court held that the patent was infringed
because persons skilled in the art would know that manganese
was equivalent to and could be substituted for magnesium.18
Graver Tank is noteworthy because, in coming to its decision,
the Court set out an evaluation standard that has become the
essence of every doctrine of equivalents analysis and because it
provided a precedent for seeking to satisfy the equitable policy
underlying the doctrine. That standard provides: "[A] paten-
tee may invoke [the doctrine of equivalents] against the pro-
ducer of a device if it performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result."'19
The policy set out in Graver Tank underlies much of the
subsequent evolution of the doctrine of equivalents. The Court
recognized that the doctrine's equitable nature would prevent
the application of any brightline rule.2" Therefore, the Court
relied on policy, stating that the doctrine is necessary "to tem-
15. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
16. Id. at 606.
17. Id. at 610. The patent claimed a welding flux containing alkaline earth metal
silicate and calcium fluoride. The Court noted, however, that the patent owner's
actual product contained only silicates of calcium and magnesium, which are both
alkaline earth metals. The infringer's flux contained silicates of calcium and
manganese, which are not an alkaline earth metal.
18. Id. at 612. The Court bolstered its conclusion by noting that the infringer
failed to make any showing that its product was developed by independent research
rather than mere imitation. Id. at 611. The Court here uses the term "skilled in the
art" as a term of art, referring to persons who are knowledgeable about the subject
matter of the patent at issue.
19. Id. at 608 (emphasis added) (citing Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280
U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). While the emphasized language was actually quoted from Sanitary
Refrigerator Co., subsequent references to this language almost always cite only
Graver Tank. See, e.g., Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 1993); Read Corp. v. Portec Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Intel
Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Malta v.
Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942
(1991); Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584, 587 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 281 (1991).
20. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609. ("Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the
prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum.").
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per unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the
benefit of an invention."'" Similarly, the Court added that "to
permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy
every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the
patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. '22
Graver Tank, however, was not a unanimous decision.
Two justices found the policy against allowing use of the doc-
trine of equivalents more persuasive. Justice Douglas argued
that the majority used the doctrine of equivalents to expand
the original patent to a welding flux that would have been
made obvious and thus unpatentable by the prior art.23 Justice
Black argued that Graver Tank was an improper place for
applying the doctrine of equivalents because: (1) the patentee
was seeking broader protection than claimed in his patent, and
(2) the majority's holding failed to "protect[] businessmen
from retroactive infringement suits and judicial expansion of a
monopoly sphere beyond that which a patent expressly
authorizes."
24
21. Id. at 608 (citing Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691, 692
(1948)).
22. Id. at 607.
23. Id. at 618 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority had used "a
doctrine which is said to protect against practicing 'a fraud on a patent' ... to extend a
patent to a composition which could not be patented").
24. Id, at 615 (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Black's second point addresses the concern that the doctrine of equivalents
may expand patent rights. One might erroneously argue that to provide a patentee
with anything the patentee did not specifically patent is to expand the patent claim.
On this point, the Federal Circuit has noted that "[t]o say that the doctrine of
equivalents extends or enlarges the claims is a contradiction in terms. The claims-
i.e., the scope of patent protection as defined by the claims-remain the same and
application of the doctrine expands the right to exclude to 'equivalents' of what is
claimed." Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1990) (emphasis omitted). This is because "[the
language and thus the breadth, of the claims never changes." We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-
Mark Int'l, 930 F.2d 1567, 1571 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1991). "[T]he purpose is to ensure that
the patent holder does not obtain a broader right to exclude under that doctrine than
could have been obtained from the patent office." Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
However, the court in Insta-foam Products v. Universal Foam Systems, 906 F.2d
698 (Fed. Cir. 1991), implied that a patentee's rights are extended under the doctrine of
equivalents, but in a limited manner. "The doctrine of equivalents cannot, of course,
be used by a patentee to extend the right to exclude others so broadly as to ensure
subject matter within the public domain." Id. at 704 (emphasis added). Insta-Foam
thus implies that some extension of the patentee's rights beyond what was claimed is
possible so long as it does not extend to the public domain.
The court in Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1004 (1984), also implied that the doctrine of equivalents expands a patent. "[The
patentee] has not given any convincing reason why we should enlarge the literal scope
1414 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 16:1409
In spite of such arguments, both Winans and Graver Tank
used the doctrine of equivalents to achieve results that would
give patent protection meaningful breadth. The Court's pri-
mary objective in each case was to encourage inventions by dis-
couraging narrow avoidance of a patent's language.25
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE PERMISSIBLE RANGE
OF EQUIVALENTS
Four sources of information limit the range of equivalents
that a patentee may be allowed to obtain: the patent, the prose-
cution history of the patent,26 the prior art related to the pat-
ent, and the degree to which the invention is of a pioneering
nature.
27
A. The Patent and Prosecution History
A court should begin an infringement analysis by looking
at the face of the patent.28 The patent claim defines the literal
limits of what the patent holder may exclude others from mak-
ing, using, or selling. Claim construction is a matter of law for
the court to decide.' A patent also has a specification that
describes the invention and methods for making it and using it.
The patent specification is secondary to the claim, and while it
may help a court understand what is claimed, it cannot be the
of the ... patent claims. Such enlargement would be particularly inappropriate here,
where we deal with 'improvement patents in a crowded art.'" Id. at 389 (citing
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The
Kinzenbaw court implied that enlargement is possible under some conditions other
than those in the case at bar.
25. See, e.g., Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08.
26. One court described prosecution history as follows: "[Wihen a patentee,
during the prosecution of his application, adds a limitation . .. in response to a
rejection based on prior art references... in an effort to overcome that rejection, the
patentee cannot later successfully argue that an accused device that lacks the ...
limitation infringes the patent." Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584, 587-88
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
27. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
28. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics,
Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("To review the district court's finding [of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents], we first have to construe the claims.")
(citing Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 771 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1026 (1984)).
29. Id. ("Claim construction is a question of law. However, when the meaning of
key terms of the claim is disputed, as in this case, and extrinsic evidence is necessary
to explain the terms, then underlying factual questions may arise.") (citing Johnson v.
IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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basis for limiting the range of equivalents.' The patent claim
and patent specification work together to define the maximum
range of equivalents. Only after a court interprets the patent,
concludes that no literal infringement exists, and determines
that finding the patent not infringed may be unfair to the pat-
entee, may the court evaluate the patent under the doctrine of
equivalents.3 '
Under this doctrine, a court should first look to the pat-
ent's prosecution history.3 2  Prosecution history is the history
of a patent's evolution from the first version of the patent sub-
mitted to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to the pat-
ent as issued.' Where the patentee has made concessions to
the patent examiner in the way of restrictions in language of
claims to obtain the patent, these concessions or restrictions
may be used to limit the patentee.34 In particular, in a subse-
quent infringement action, the patentee is prevented or
estopped from asserting claim interpretations that encompass
the conceded claim limitations against the alleged infringer."5
This is known as prosecution history estoppel.
30. While the specification may assist the court, it may not serve as the basis for
defining the invention's patentability. As stated in one case: "[T]his court has
repeatedly held that it is the claims which define the invention. The district court
therefore erred in comparing the[ ] specification figures with the prior art to determine
the patentability of the invention." Uniroyal v. Rudkin-Wiley, 837 F.2d 1044, 1053
(Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988) (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781
F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
31. See Wallace London and Clemco Prods., Inc. v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946
F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The court in this case stated:
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the
rule, for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent
claims can never be relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply
the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend
protection beyond the scope of the claims, then claims fail to serve their
intended purpose. Competitors will never know whether their actions
infringe a granted patent.
Id. at 1538.
32. See We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that "equivalency is determined in light of prior art, the patent specification,
and the prosecution history").
33. See generally 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.02[3] (1991) (describing
prosecution history and its application under the doctrine of prosecution history).
34. See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genemtech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). In Genemtech, the court stated that "[p]rosectuion history estoppel is a
judicially accepted limitation to the doctrine of equivalents. Under that limitation, a
patentee cannot recapture through equivalence certain coverage given up by argument
or amendment during prosecution." I& at 1564 (citation omitted).
35. Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See also quote
supra note 26.
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Prosecution history, like prior art, helps define the periph-
ery of patent protection against infringement; both are often
used to defend against infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 36 While prosecution history estoppel may limit
the range of infringement actions that a patent owner can suc-
cessfully bring, it is possible for a prospective patentee to limit
its effect.
The Federal Circuit in Insta-Foam Products v. Universal
Foam Systems 37 addressed a situation where prosecution his-
tory estoppel failed to prevent a patentee from recovering for
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The court in
Insta-Foam considered whether Universal's foam gun dispens-
ing mechanism infringed on Insta-Foam's patent claim.3s After
finding that Universal's gun performed substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain substantially
the same result as Insta-Foam's gun, the court considered
whether the prosecution history limited the range of
equivalents that Insta-Foam could claim. 9
Although Insta-Foam's patent application had initially
been rejected by the patent examiner, Insta-Foam avoided the
prosecution history by not commenting on the merits of the
patent examiner's rejection, but simply by redrafting around
the objection without making any specific concessions.4" The
court thus concluded that Insta-Foam's invention was not lim-
ited by the prosecution history and that Universal had
infringed on Insta-Foam's patent. Insta-Foam was able to elim-
36. See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1990). In Genentech, the court stated:
Prosecution history estoppel is a judicially accepted limitation to the doctrine
of equivalents. Under that limitation, a patentee cannot "recapture through
equivalents certain coverage given up [by argument or amendment] during
prosecution." That is not to say, however, that, whenever a limiting
amendment or argument is made during prosecution, the patentee loses all
coverage between what the claims literally cover and what they would have
covered prior to the amendment or argument.
Id. at 1564 (citations omitted).
37. 906 F.2d 698, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
38. Insta-Foam's patent described a foam dispensing gun consisting of three
relevant elements: a trigger, a plunger, and a ball. Insta-Foam's trigger and plunger
were integrated into a single part. Universal's allegedly infringing dispenser had
instead integrated the plunger and ball into a single part. However, both used all
three parts, the trigger, plunger, and ball, moving together to effect the same result.
Id. at 700.
39. Id. at 702-03.
40. Id. at 703.
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inate any potential effect of the prosecution history's limita-
tions on the range of equivalents. The court held as follows:
Whenever prosecution history estoppel is invoked as a limi-
tation to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, a
close examination must be made as to, not only what was
surrendered, but also the reason for such a surrender.
Amendments may be of different types and may serve dif-
ferent functions. Depending on its nature and purpose, an
amendment may have a limiting effect within a spectrum
ranging from great to small to zero.4'
While the patent claim and the prosecution history form the
preliminary framework for defining the range of equivalents,
the range of equivalents may also be limited by prior art.
B. The Prior Art
After considering the patent claim and the prosecution
history to define a patent's potential range of equivalents, a
court must consider whether the prior art4 further narrows a
patent's range of equivalents.
[A] patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine
of equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have
obtained from the PTO by literal claims. The doctrine of
equivalents exists to prevent a fraud on a patent, not to give
a patentee something which he could not lawfully have
obtained from the PTO had he tried. Thus, since the prior
art always limits what an inventor could have claimed, it
limits the range of permissible equivalents of a claim.
43
In Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assocs.,4
the court had to decide whether an icosahedral 4s dimple pat-
tern on Dunlop's golf balls infringed on Wilson's golf ball dim-
41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
43. We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 1570-1571 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (citing Wilson Sporting Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir.), cerL denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1990)). See also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead
Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[W]e note that the claimed invention
is a mechanical combination in a crowded field.... Such an invention is entitled only
to a narrow scope of equivalents.").
44. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1990).
45. Icosahedral is a pattern formed on a sphere by placing five equilateral
triangles at the pole of the sphere. The area from the bottom of these triangles to the
equator of the sphere is covered by ten additional equilateral triangles and the other
hemisphere has an identical pattern. The four belts created by these triangles are
nested such that every point of a triangle touches four other triangles. This pattern
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ple pattern.46 The basic pattern was not new and had been
patented as far back as 1932.47 The court used a completely
new technique to evaluate whether the Dunlop ball infringed
on the Wilson patent. The court suggested that a helpful tool
is to conceptualize a hypothetical patent claim that would liter-
ally cover the accused product.4  If the hypothetical claim
could have been allowed by the PTO over the prior art, then
the accused product infringes on the patent.49 Again, the pat-
entee has the burden of proving that the equivalent it seeks
would not ensnare the prior art.'
After comparing the patent, the allegedly infringing item,
and the prior art, the court found that there was "simply 'no
principled difference' between the hypothetical claim and the
prior art."51 This commonality with the prior art prevented
Wilson from successfully asserting that Dunlop had infringed
its patent.
Rather than clarifying the doctrine of equivalents, Wilson
left the intellectual property community with a masterfully
tied Gordian knot with no apparent Alexander the Great avail-
able to cleave the problem for a quick solution.52 However,
Judge Rich helped resolve some of the confusion that followed
from his Wilson opinion in Jurgens v. McKasy.5 s In Jurgens,
Judge Rich stated the following: "We have recently noted that
it may be helpful to 'conceptualize' the prior art limitations on
the doctrine of equivalents by envisioning a hypothetical pat-
creates six skew planes each precisely dividing the golf ball in half around a separate
plane of symmetry.
46. Wilson, 904 F.2d at 678-79. The Wilson patent was unique in that it defined
the golf balls dimples as not overlapping the icosahedral great circles at all. Id. at 680.
Other prior art included a patent by Uniroyal in which the dimples intersected the
great circle pattern by .012" to .015". Id. at 680-81. Dunlop's Maxfli golf balls had an
icosahedral pattern in which the dimples overlapped the great circles by .004" to .009".
Id. at 681.
47. Patent 194,030,432 disclosed an icosahedral golf ball dimple pattern in which
the dimples were centered on the six great circles.
48. Wilson, 904 F.2d at 684.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 685.
51. Id.
52. Wilson prompted several authors to propound at length on the decision's
possible consequences. See Michael L. Keller & Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Patent Law
Developments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During
1990, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1157 (1990); Henrik D. Parker, Doctrine of Equivalents
Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods: The Hypothetical Claim Hydra, 18 AIPLA Q.J.
262 (1990); William E. Eshelman, Comment, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Post-Pennwalt Developments, 65 TUL. L. REv. 883 (1991).
53. 927 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 281 (1991).
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ent claim .... ,I Judge Rich's use of non-compulsory language
regarding the hypothetical indicates that he considered it
merely one possible tool for evaluating prior art. This position
was reaffirmed in Key Manufacturing Group v. Microdot,
Inc.5 In Key Manufacturing Group, the court stated that the
Wilson hypothetical was not intended as an obligitory
equivalents analysis method, but merely a helpful way to
define the limits imposed by prior art on the range of
equivalents that a patent holder may claim.56
Thus, the Wilson hypothetical method for evaluating the
effect of prior art on the range of a patentee's equivalents is
merely one method for evaluating prior art. Whether the
hypothetical or some other method is used, the prior art works
in conjunction with the patent, the prosecution history, and
usually the pioneering nature of the patent to define a patent's
range of equivalents.
C. The Pioneering Nature of a Patent
Very early in the development of the doctrine of
equivalents, it was conceived that the range of a patent's
equivalents would be limited by the degree to which the patent
was a pioneering invention. 7 Courts have often stated that
"the range of equivalents depends on and varies with the
degree of invention."-"
Pioneering inventions may claim a broad range of
equivalents. 59 An invention that is not as revolutionary as a
pioneering invention, but which is a significant evolution over
prior inventions, is afforded a substantial range of
equivalents. ° Inventions made in a crowded field with little
54. I& at 1561.
55. 925 F.2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
56. Id. at 1449.
57. See Morley Sewing-Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889)
(adopting the concept of expanding a patentee's rights where the claim was
particularly innovative, although not specifically using the term "pioneering nature").
58. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S.
405, 412 (1908); Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 187 (1894).
59. See Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 842 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Shields v. Halliburton Co., 667 F.2d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1982)
60. See Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 394 (10th Cir. 1974)
(stating that "a marked improvement in the art is entitled to a substantial range of
equivalents"). See also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
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significant evolution are afforded only a very narrow range of
equivalents.61
While gauging inventiveness might at first seem a useful
way to interpret the range of equivalents, it is helpful to con-
sider its effective impact and practicality.62 Consider a modifi-
cation of the paper clip example discussed earlier. Imagine
that the original paper clip patent has expired and that stan-
dard three bend paper clips are now made from many different
materials in all sorts of sizes and colors. An inventor discovers
that by flanging the paper clip's tips apart about thirty degrees,
the paper clip will slide more easily onto a stack of paper. The
paper clip area is now a crowded field and this invention's lack
of significant pioneering would entitle it, at most, to a narrow
range of equivalents; it might perhaps be limited only to paper
clips with tips flanged a few degrees more or less than the
specified thirty degrees. A court interpreting the range of
equivalents in this context must narrow the range of
equivalents by considering the prior art. 3 After considering
all of the items crowding the field, the impact of considering
the pioneering nature may be negligible.
Prescribing a limited range of equivalents because an
invention is not pioneering may erroneously skew the judicial
determination by considering inventiveness both in the context
of the amount of prior art and in the context of the pioneering
nature of the patent claim.6 In a crowded area, there is a
great deal of prior art that narrows the range of equivalents
that the patentee may claim. Similarly, it is oximoronic to
speak of a pioneering invention in a crowded field; for an
invention to be pioneering, it must open a new field.6 1 It is
appropriate to think of a pioneering invention as conferring a
benefit on society that is comparatively great as a result of its
revolutionary rather than evolutionary impact. In short, there
will never be much prior art if the invention is pioneering, and
61. See Chemical Engineering Corp. v. Essef Indus., Inc., 795 F.2d 1565, 1573 n.8
(Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The district court correctly held on the record before it that [the
patent] could not be considered a pioneer patent, because it issued in a crowded art.").
62. The term "inventiveness" is used here, as by many courts, to connote the
patent's degree of evolution. As used here, the term does not suggest that the patent
lacks invention, for that would be a contradiction in terms under the requirements for
patentability. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
63. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
64. CHISUM, supra note 33, § 18, at 18-111.
65. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558,
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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conversely, there will be much prior art if the invention is not
pioneering.
There is considerable overlap in considering both the prior
art and the pioneering nature. This consideration effectively
forces double consideration of the lack of the invention's pio-
neering nature. Thus, pioneering nature based on a patent's
"inventiveness," distinct from the prior art, can be a mislead-
ing guideline and has promoted one scholar to remark that
"[d]espite the frequency with which it is evoked, the 'range'
concept is of doubtful value as an aid in the construction of
patent claims. '
Because the Federal Circuit has not abandoned considera-
tion of an invention's pioneering nature in fixing a range of
equivalents to which a patent may be entitled, it is helpful to
use it in conjunction with the patent claim, the prior art, and
the prosecution history in evaluating a patentee's limit for a
successful doctrine of equivalents claim.
IV. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The doctrine of equivalents is based on equitable princi-
ples that may be grouped into three general goals. The first is
the fundamental goal underlying patent protection: to pro-
mote the development of useful arts. 7 The second and third
goals, in contrast, provide a practical limit on how much pro-
tection should be afforded a patent. On the one hand, a person
should not be able to exploit a patentee's contribution by nar-
rowly designing around the patent's express language.68 On
the other hand, a person trying to design around someone
else's patent may advance the useful arts, technology, and
should be provided patent protection if he makes an advance
over the patented subject matter.69 In trying to balance these
goals, courts have struggled to find a method for applying the
doctrine of equivalents that will meet equitable ends with judi-
cial certainty.
66. CHISUM, supra note 33, § 18, at 18-111.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
68. See Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)
(recognizing that meaningful patent protection must prevent avoiding a claim of
infringement through insubstantial changes to the inventor).
69. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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A. Encouraging Invention
Patent protection is intended to encourage inventions in
the useful arts. Where an invention offers little that is new or
useful, the Federal Circuit is not inclined to provide apprecia-
ble protective breadth under the doctrine of equivalents.70 Key
Manufacturing Group v. Microdot, Inc.,7 1 provides an excel-
lent example of a court limiting the range of equivalents to
encourage useful invention.
Key Manufacturing Group held a patent for a decorative
lug nut used to secure automobile wheels to a car. The prior
art was crowded by many alternative decorative nuts. Key
Manufacturing Group's patent claim used two limitations to
avoid the prior art: first, a decorative cap was to be welded to
the nut over a substantial area, and second, the nut had a
flange perpendicular to the axis of the nut.72
Microdot produced a competing decorative nut. The
Microdot nut also had a decorative cap, but the cap was spot
welded in place rather than being welded over a substantial
area. Additionally, the Microdot nut had a flange that was at a
fifteen degree angle to the nut's axis rather than perpendicular
to the nut's axis. The district court held that because the nuts
could be used interchangeably, Microdot had infringed Key
Manufacturing Group's patent both literally and under the
doctrine of equivalents.
73
The Federal Circuit overturned both the literal and
equivalent infringement findings and stated that a Wilson
"hypothetical claim drawn to cover literally the Microdot nut
would not be patentable over the prior art.' 74 In other words,
where a patent is minimally innovative, it will receive little
protection under the doctrine of equivalents.
Limiting the range of items against which a patent holder
may claim infringement is one method for encouraging techno-
logical advancement of existing technology because it allows
competitive development in the area of the patent claim. The
challenge in encouraging technological advancement lies in dis-
cerning an advancement over existing patents from an
70. See Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1324 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. 925 F.2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 1448-49.
73. Id. at 1449.
74. Id.
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exploitation of the patented subject matter. If patents are
granted exteremely large ranges of equivalents, then neither
patent holders nor potential inventors of related technology
have any motivation to continue development because the pat-
entee retains the exclusive right to capitalize on that field of
technology. If, on the other hand, a patent holder is granted a
very narrow range of equivalents, then a potential inventor is
discouraged from inventing because he cannot capitalize on his
efforts.
B. Discouraging Fraud on a Patent
The doctrine of equivalents requires looking beyond the
policy of merely encouraging inventions in situations where
the infringing item does not make a sufficiently substantial
change.75 The designer seeking to pirate the benefits of
another patented invention should not be rewarded; yet, the
designer may at times develop a distinguishable and useful
invention. This is the tension between discouraging piracy and
encouraging useful significant evolution.
In Wallace London and Clemco Products, Inc. v. Carson
Pirie Scott & Co.,76 the court recognized the policy problems of
overly broad patent protection. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. (Sam-
sonite) had allegedly infringed on Wallace's garment bag hang-
ing system. Wallace developed a hang bag clamp that allowed
the lower bar of the clamp to open to allow the hangers to be
removed. Samsonite subsequently designed a hang bag clamp
that allowed the upper bar of the clamp to open to allow the
75. For some time, courts applied the doctrine of equivalents to find that an article
infringed on a patent claim when the article used the heart of the claim. However, the
court in Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir.
1987), suggested that such language was improper:
We are aware of dicta that state consideration of the "essence", "gist", or
"heart" of the invention may be helpful in determining infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents.... That dicta... must be read as shorthand for
the considerations set forth in Graver Tank, i.e., that the infringer should not
appropriate the invention by making substitutions [which] . . . do not
substantially change the function performed, or the way it is performed, by
the invention.
Id at 1531 n.8. For a vigorous dissent on this point, see Perkin-Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at
1535-44 (Newman, J., dissenting). See also Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The doctrine of equivalents is designed to protect inventors from
unscrupulous copyists ... and unanticipated equivalents.") (citing Graver Tank & Mfg.
v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)).
76. 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1993] 1423
1424 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 16:1409
hangers to be removed.77 The court acknowledged Samsonite's
efforts to design around Wallace's patents, commenting that
"[a]lthough inventing around patents to make new inventions
is encouraged, piracy is not."7 Reversing summary judgment
for Wallace, and entering instead summary judgment for Sam-
sonite, the court nevertheless held that the two clamps were
sufficiently different to avoid infringement.79 Specifically, the
court observed a significant difference in the Samsonite
design.8 0
Although the Wallace decision suggests that the doctrine
of equivalents did not apply, the court reached its decision only
after performing a doctrine of equivalents analysis and decid-
ing that Samsonite avoided infringing on Wallace's patent.8 l
C. Encouraging Useful Evolution Over Existing Patents
The primary policy for granting monopoly protection to
patent holders is to encourage development of the useful arts. 2
Similarly, however, a patent should not confer such a broad
interest in an invention that all advancement related to that
invention must be halted for the life of the patent. In Slim fold
Manufacturing Co. v. Kinkead Industries, Inc.,83 the court
decided that intent to design around existing patents is not by
itself relevant to applying the equivalent analysis.84 The court
explained that designing around patents potentially encourages
technological development, which, in turn, benefits society."
The court then balanced the need to encourage useful develop-
ment in the arts against a person's willful intent to take the
fruits of another. Leaning heavily toward encouraging new
evolutionary development, 6 the court stated: "It is only when
77. Id, at 1535-36.
78. Id. at 1538.
79. Id. at 1540.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM: STUDY No. 15 OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS,
85TH CONG., 2D SESS. 51 (1958) (stating that one justification for promoting competitive
research is that "research teams engaged in inventing around patents [sometimes] hit
upon something really useful").
83. 932 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
84. Id. at 1457.
85. Id.
86. Id. See also Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1035 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) ("The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine which prevents fraud
on a patent.").
Reshaping the Doctrine of Equivalents
the changes are so insubstantial as to result in 'a fraud on the
patent' that the application of the equitable doctrine of
equivalents becomes desirable.1
8 7
Thus, application of the doctrine of equivalents should
attempt to balance three primary policies: (1) to encourage
and protect only truly inventive patents, (2) to discourage
piracy or fraud on a patent, and (3) to encourage evolutionary
inventions. Effective implementation of these policies requires
practical methods for applying them to specific situations.
V. RESPONSIBILITY AND METHODS FOR
INTERPRETING EQUIVALENTS
Although correctly defining a patent claim's range of
equivalents requires a consideration of the equitable policies
underlying the doctrine, a reliable method for applying the
doctrine is necessary to produce consistently equitable results.
One difficulty in defining the range of equivalents is knowing
at what level an equivalent may be defined. Some courts have
defined the range of equivalents by looking at the patent as a
whole, 8 while other courts have scrutinized each limit of each
element of the patent claim. 9 The evaluation method will
influence the judge or jury's control over the outcome.
Describing the areas of responsibility that have been assigned
to the judge or to the jury will help to explain the effect of the
Federal Circuit's recent adjustments in the doctrine of
equivalents infringement analysis. It will also help to take a
cautionary note of an analytical method that the Federal Cir-
cuit has clearly prohibited,90 but which nonetheless is repeat-
edly employed by district courts.9 '
A. Who Really Decides: The Judge or The Jury?
As currently applied, the doctrine of equivalents creates a
potential conflict between the judge and jury in determining
87. Slimfold, 932 F.2d at 1457.
88. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1963).
89. See Read Corp. v. Portec, 970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Malta v.
Schulmerich Carillons, 952 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
90. See Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 822 n.2.
91. See, e.g., Innovative Scuba Concepts, Inc. v. Feder Indus., Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5495, at *11-12 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 1993) (stating that "[i]n the case of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the acccused device is compared with
the claimed invention as a whole").
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infringement. This conflict arises because questions of law and
questions of fact often overlap and are interdependent.
The Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing v. Linde Air
Products Co. 92 announced that a finding of equivalence is a
determination of fact and therefore within the province of the
jury. Thus, when arguing infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents to a jury, the patentee is required to present a com-
prehensive showing of how the patent and the allegedly
infringing item are the same.93 The jury must then determine
the relevant prior art, infringement, and equivalence.94 The
construction of the patent claim, however, is a question of
law.95 "[I]f ambiguity is thought to surround the prosecution
history. ... that could give rise to a question of fact underlying
the legal question of claim construction."'  Consequently,
there is a significant interrelationship between what the jury
must be provided and what it must determine.9 7
92. 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). See also Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1034 ("This court
reviews patent infringement findings as questions of fact. Therefore, only clear errors
warrant correction.") (citing Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir.
1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984); Hartness Int'l v. Simplimatic Eng'g Co., 819
F.2d 1100, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
93. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (citing Nestier Corp. v. Menasha Corp.-Lewisystems Div., 739 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985)). The court in Lear interpreted Nestier to
require that in presenting a doctrine of equivalents infringement claim to a jury, "the
three Graver Tank elements must be presented in the form of particularized
testimony and linking argument." Id. at 1426 (emphasis added). See also Malta v.
Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942
(1991) (holding that a patentee would show particularized testimony and linking
argument if the patentee's "testimony is a sufficient explanation of both why the
overall function, way, and result of the accused device are substantially the same as
those of the claimed device and why the [accused device] is the equivalent of the
claimed... limitation") (emphasis omitted).
94. See Malta, 952 F.2d at 1325 ("The issues of infringement and of equivalency
are issues of fact") (citing Sun Studs, Inc., v. ATA Equip. Leasing Inc., 872 F.2d 978,
986 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). See also Charles Greiner, 962 F.2d at 1034; Jurgens v. McKasy,
927 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 281 (1991).
95. See Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 835 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (holding that "[c]laim interpretation is a question of law") (citing Hormone
Research Found. v. Genentech, 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Loctite v.
Ultraseal, 781 F.2d 861, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). See also Key Mfg. Group v. Microdot, 925
F.2d 1444, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Molecon Research Corp. v. CBS Inc., 793 F.2d
1261, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987); Charles Greiner & Co.,
Inc. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
96. Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
97. This relationship often creates decisive interpretations of what is or is not
within the province of the jury. See, e.g., Malta, 952 F.2d at 1331-34 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
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B. Defining Equivalent Elements Using Each Limitation
Recently, a well-known scholar erroneously stated that
"equivalency is still determined by comparing the claimed sub-
ject matter as a whole and the accused device."98 This state-
ment is undoubtedly the result of a dramatic shift in the
Federal Circuit's methodology for applying equivalents.
Recent decisions have held that infringement requires that
every limitation of a claim be met exactly or by a substantial
equivalent. 9 Thus, under this requirement, contemplation of
equivalency between the accused device and the patented
invention as a whole is erroneous.'0°
The Federal Circuit's shift, however, appears to have
reached an apogee past which it may no further proceed with-
out completely eliminating the doctrine of equivalents. This
limit necessarily exists because requiring comparative identity
between a device and a patent claim at a level more compre-
hensive than the claimed limits will require literal infringe-
ment.' 0 ' To illustrate this point more completely, the
following subsections analyze the Federal Circuit's shift in
three stages of historical progression: comparing devices as a
whole, comparing devices as a whole or by the device's limita-
tions, and comparing devices only by their limitations.
1. The Claim as a Whole
Until fairly recently, the widely accepted method for
determining whether a device infringed a patent claim was by
"comparing the claimed subject matter as a whole and the
accused device.'102 Comparing the claim "as a whole" appears
to have been the rule until sometime in the mid-1980s. Perkin-
Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.10 3 held that the
appeals court did not need to determine whether the district
court erred in finding no infringement based only on the
absence of equivalence in two claim limitations, because the
differences were sufficient "to cause the accused devices to
operate as wholes in a way not substantially the same as that
98. CHISUM, supra note 33, § 18, at 18-76 n.3 (emphasis omitted).
99. See, e.g., Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
100. See, e.g., id at 822 n.2.
101. See infra part V.B.3.
102. CHISUM, supra note 33, § 18, at 18-76 n.3 (emphasis omitted). See also Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that it was
error not to "apply the doctrine of equivalents to the claimed invention as a whole").
103. 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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in which the claimed devices operate as wholes."'1 4 Later in
the same year, the Federal Circuit in another decision provided
that the "as a whole" approach was no longer the only
approach. 0 5
2. A Time of Ambiguity: The Claim as a Whole
or as Every Limitation
Although not widely realized at the time, in Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durland-Wyland, Inc.,"°3 the court marked what the
Federal Circuit would identify as the demise of evaluating
equivalents as whole devices." 7
The Pennwalt court evaluated whether a fruit sorting sys-
tem patent had been infringed. The court found no infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents and stated "that the
district court correctly relied on an element-by-element com-
parison to conclude that there was no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, because the accused device did not per-
form substantially the same functions as the Pennwalt inven-
tion."10' The Pennwalt court apparently did not believe that
an element-by-element comparison of equivalents of a claim's
limitations and the accused device was the only method for
applying the doctrine of equivalents. Specifically, the court
stated that "infringement may be found . . . if an accused
device performs substantially the same overall function or
works in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially
the same overall result as the claimed invention."'0 9
Whatever the Pennwalt court intended, subsequent Fed-
eral Circuit decisions did not lead to a clear rejection of the "as
a whole" rule in all cases." 0 For example, two years after
104. Id. at 1530 n.5.
105. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1987).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonic Metrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1389 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (identifying Pennwalt as requiring "every limitation" analysis for equivalents
and rejecting comparison to the overall device).
108. Id. at 935.
109. Id. at 934 (emphasis in original). The lack of grammatical parallelism in
dropping the word "overall" from the "way" prong of the analysis is noteworthy
because there would seldom be a colorable claim if a device failed to perform the same
function and achieve the same result. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
is primarily used to evaluate the "way" prong, and by deleting the related "overall"
requirement the court may have been intending that the element-by-element
comparison of limitations apply only when evaluating the "way" prong.
110. See Eshelman, supra note 52 (arguing that after Pennwalt, there are proper
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Pennwalt, the Federal Circuit stated that it specifically did not
set out a definitive formula for determining equivalency, but
that performing an equivalency analysis using claim limitations
was merely a helpful approach.""
The court in Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equipment Leasing,
Inc.112 tried to clarify the rule that the element-by-element
analysis was optional. The court stated that "[o]ne-to-one cor-
respondence of components is not required, and elements or
steps may be combined without ipso facto loss of
equivalency.""13 Sun Studs suggests that a court applying the
doctrine of equivalents may interpret the range of equivalents
based on the patent, its prosecution history, and the prior art
using either the "every limit" method or the "substantially the
same manner" method, which seems to be synonymous with
the "as a whole" method. This perspective, however, turned
out to be very short-lived.
3. The Claim as Every Limitation
The Federal Circuit has completely and unmistakably
abandoned comparison of the patent invention "as a whole" to
the accused device when performing doctrine of equivalents
infringement analysis." 4 Numerous Federal Circuit decisions
in the last three years reflect a growing adversity toward appli-
cation of the doctrine of equivalents to components, claims,
devices, patents, or inventions, instead of exclusively to claim
limitations." 5 The Federal Circuit specifically discourages
"speaking of 'equivalency' between [an] accused device and [a]
places like simple inventions for application of "as a whole" approach and places like
complex issues where "each" approach limitation analysis is more appropriate, and
arguing that Pennwalt did not answer what defines an equivalent).
111. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., 868 F.2d 1251, 1260 (Fed.
Cir. 1989). See also Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1057 (Fed.
Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988) (holding that the district properly found a
doctrine of equivalents infringement of a patent for a truck wind deflector even
though the district court applied the doctrine of equivalents only to two specific claim
limitations rather than determining whether the device "performs in substantially the
same manner") (emphasis in original).
112. 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 989. See also Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d
821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1259).
114. See Read Corp. v. Portec Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
115. See Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 822; Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384,
1389 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Key Mfg. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 281 (1991);
Becton Dickinson and Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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patented invention."'"1 6 The correct way is to "speak only of
infringement of a claim and of an equivalent to a limitation of
the claim." ' 7
The paper clip hypothetical provides an example of the
practical effect of the new "every limit" method. Imagine a
patent that reads: "I claim-A non-invasive paper fastening
device comprising a piece of wire comprised of metal, said wire
having three 180 U-bends, said bends all lying in a single geo-
metric plane." The accused device is identical in all respects
except that it is made of plastic, a material that had not been
developed when the patent issued. The function and result of
both the accused device and the claim are identical-they both
use the clip's shape to hold papers together. Under the former
method of comparison as a whole, the relevant question is
whether a metal paper clip functions in substantially the same
way as a plastic paper clip. Under the new method of compari-
son of every element, the relevant question is whether metal
functions in substantially the same way as plastic. This latter
question appears to be a much narrower issue and much more
likely to result in a finding of non-infringement.
One commentator has argued that the "every limitation"
test is appropriate in complex situations where a jury is
involved, while the "as a whole" test works best for simpler
devices.11 8 But by adopting the "every limitation" test exclu-
sively, the Federal Circuit is essentially making a policy deci-
sion that any doctrine of equivalents infringement analysis is
too difficult for juries to fully understand.
VI. EXPANDING THE USE OF HYPOTHETICAL ANALYSIS
The doctrine of equivalents will be a judicially uncertain
method of analysis as long as it remains an equitable doctrine
that is not defined by brightline rules. Moreover, as the Fed-
eral Circuit has demonstrated over the past few years, the
method for applying the doctrine may also change, further
compounding such uncertainty."- 9 These changes are likely to
correspond to differing perceptions of the proper balance of
policies underlying the doctrine. The Federal Circuit's strict,
new "every limitation" analysis method will probably cause
116. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 822 n.2.
117. Id. (citation omitted).
118. See Eshelman, supra note 52.
119. See supra part V.B.
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fewer courts to find infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. The new method apparently reflects a policy shift
from preventing fraud on a patent to encouraging evolutionary
invention. The Federal Circuit's shift may also be attributed to
its lack of confidence in juries and district courts, who seldom
hear patent cases involving doctrine of equivalents infringe-
ment. A brief summary of the problems remaining with the
doctrine of equivalents, however, will serve to emphasize the
benefits of applying the proposal offered in this Comment.
A. A Problem Calling for Change
There is an inherent educational conflict in the patent dis-
pute system. Often only the litigants fully understand a pat-
ent, particularly if the patent involves sophisticated
technological developments. For instance, the litigants may be
the only people in the world focusing on the genetic or elec-
tronic development covered by a patent. In such a conflict, it is
not possible to educate the judge or jury sufficiently so that
they can fully grasp the technology at issue, appreciate how lit-
tle or how much that technology steps away from the prior art,
or determine the degree to which it is a pioneering invention.
Consequently, if the decision-maker lacks specialized knowl-
edge, it will not be possible to accurately define equivalents
using any technique.
The court in Intel Corp. v. United States International
Trade Commission12 ° faced this problem in addressing the
alleged infringement of computer chips. Intel Corporation had
made significant strides in electrically programmable read only
memory devices (EPROMs). Atmel and GuM were found to
have infringed Intel's patented EPROM. 121 Both Atmel's and
GUM's systems used a multiplexer to direct signals coming
into the memory device, while Intel integrated a selective sig-
nal acceptance function using an address buffer to direct sig-
nals coming into the EPROM. The court affirmed the United
States International Trade Commission's (ITC) finding that
although Atmel and GI/M used a different method for process-
ing the signal, it infringed on Intel's patent because the same
function was performed elsewhere in the accused device.122
The technical complexity of the claimed infringement
120. 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
121. Id. at 824.
122. Id. at 832.
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combined with a lack of familiarity with the doctrine of
equivalents could have created confusion for a jury. Although
the ITC may not have been as familiar with the technology as
the litigants, the court pointed out that fortunately, "[u]nlike a
jury in a district court case, the [International Trade] Commis-
sion resolves disputes involving patent infringement matters
with some regularity and thus is aware of doctrine of
equivalents jurisprudence."' Thus, the Federal Circuit seems
to recognize that a jury may have difficulty achieving equitable
decisions using the doctrine of equivalents as it is currently
applied.
B. A Proposal for Improvement: The Every
Element Hypothetical
The requirement that a decision-maker find literal or
equivalent infringement of each claim limitation seems to stem
from the Federal Circuit's apprehension over the competence
of juries to properly apply the doctrine of equivalents. 24 The
Federal Circuit, however, has a more effective tool available
that, with a modest amount of modification, could achieve the
same objective more effectively. The hypothetical proposed in
Wilson should be adopted as the standard analysis method,
expanding it to contemplate not merely limitations imposed by
the prior art, but also each limitation of the patent claim, the
patent's prosecution history, and the pioneering nature of the
invention.
The benefit of this proposal becomes clear when viewed in
the context of the judge and jury's respective responsibilities.
Because the judge has the responsibility for claim interpreta-
tion, construction of the hypothetical would primarily be the
judge's responsibility and would be reviewable de novo. The
jury would have input into what constitutes prior art because
that is a determination of fact. After the hypothetical claim is
determined, the jury would have the benefit of the hypotheti-
cal to determine whether it is equivalent to the original claim.
Finally, the accused device would have to read on the
equivalent version of the claim in order to find infringement.
123. Id. at 832-33.
124. See Read Corp. v. Portec Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("[L]imitations of the claim must be the focus of the inquiry, particularly in jury
trials. Otherwise, laymen may be led to comparison of devices, rather than between
the accused device and the claim, and to rely on generalities in the overall purpose of
the devices.") (emphasis added).
Reshaping the Doctrine of Equivalents
When it was first introduced, Judge Rich stated that use of
the hypothetical for evaluating prior art was a helpful, but
optional tool.' The patent community recieved his proposal
with both skepticism and fear, but it would be more appropri-
ate to embrace and expand on his idea. 6 The hypothetical
tool is just as well-suited to evaluating a patent, its prosecution
history, and its inventiveness as it is to evaluating prior art.
The hypothetical need not be merely a tool for the decision-
maker to use, but could be an effective litigating tool for the
parties. Just as a picture often communicates better than
words, expanded use of the hypothetical would provide an effi-
cient means for defining the range of equivalents and would
avoid potential jury confusion.
The effectiveness of the hypothetical is best considered
with an example. To illustrate how expanding the hypotheti-
cal analysis to include all aspects of analysis under the doctrine
of equivalents, consider the familiar paper clip. The effective-
ness of the hypothetical can be illustrated by setting up a pat-
ent, prior art, prosecution history, the pioneering nature of the
claimed patent, and some potentially infringing items.
1. The Patent, Prior Art, Prosecution History, and
Pioneering Nature
Imagine that the world did not have paper clips of any
sort, but that it did have staples, tape, and clothes pins,
although no one had thought of using clothes pins for fastening
papers together. Mr. Clip's standard three bend paper clip was
a remarkable success. Within two months one million paper
clips were sold. Imitators began rushing into production. Mr.
Clip quickly applied for a patent.
Mr. Clip's original patent claim application read: "I
claim-A paper fastening device comprised of a material that
may be bent several times for securing multiple sheets of
paper." The PTO realized that Mr. Clip's patent application
would include staples and tape (they apparently did not think
that clothes pins were relevant). Mr. Clip conceded and
rephrased his patent to read: "I claim-A non-invasive paper
125. See supra part III.B (contrasting Judge Rich's opinions in Wilson Sporting
Goods v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537
(1990) and Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 281
(1991)).
126. See Parker, supra note 52.
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fastening device comprised of a piece of wire made of metal,
said wire having three 180 U-bends, said bends all lying in a
single geometric plane." This concession is the complete prose-
cution history.
Some time after Mr. Clip patented his paper clip, plastic
was invented and replaced metal wire hair pins. Ms. Crafty
obtained a license to use the plastic and made a plastic three-
bend paper clip the same shape as Mr. Clip's. Mr. Clip argues
that his patent is being infringed on under the doctrine of
equivalents by both devices. The problem is to find a way to
reliably apply the doctrine of equivalents to such a fact pattern
and produce a decision that is consistent with the policies
underlying that doctrine.
2. Problems Applying the "Every Limit" Method
The "every limit" method for evaluating doctrine of
equivalents infringement could potentially fail to properly bal-
ance the equitable policies underlying the doctrine. This fail-
ure can be illustrated under the paper clip example by
identifying the patent claim limits, performing a limit-by-limit
comparison to each of the accused devices, and identifying the
potential for skewed analysis of the limits that are not exactly
met.
Evaluating Mr. Clip's infringement action under the
"every-limit" approach requires that the patent's claim limits
be defined. The three bend paper clip patent has five limits:
(1) it is non-invasive, (2) made of metal wire, (3) with three
bends, (4) in a single plane, and (5) the bends are U-shaped.
The claim limits are compared to that of the accused
device to find which limits are exactly met and which are met
by a substantial equivalent. Ms. Crafty's three bend plastic
paper clip is non-invasive and has three U-shaped bends in a
single plane. Thus, the only limit not exactly met is the second
requirement that the device be made of metal wire. The ques-
tion under the doctrine of equivalents becomes whether plastic
wire performs substantially the same function in substantially
the same way to achieve substantially the same result as metal
wire.
To answer this question, a jury will have to decide: (1)
whether there are any analogous materials in the prior art, (2)
whether Mr. Clip's revised version of his claim actually con-
ceded that the device had to be made of metal, (3) whether the
Reshaping the Doctrine of Equivalents
intervening invention of plastic and substitution for metal in
hair-pins made the substitution obvious, (4) whether the paper
clip was so ingenious that it deserved the broader range of
equivalents afforded a pioneering invention, and, based on the
preceding, (5) whether plastic wire works in substantially the
same way as metal and thus whether Ms. Crafty's device
infringes Mr. Clip's patent.
3. Expanded Hypothetical Analysis
Expanded hypothetical analysis could be accomplished by
requiring the parties to submit their version of how the hypo-
thetical would read and how their interpretation properly
accounts for the prior art, prosecution history, and pioneering
nature of the invention. In essence, both an expanded hypo-
thetical analysis and an "every-limit" analysis will have the
same people making the same decision. The advantage is that
the hypothetical method forces a step-by-step analysis into the
decision-making process. In Mr. Clip's case, the jury would
answer three questions: (1) Is there any prior art? (2) Was the
addition of the word 'metal' to Mr. Clip's claim made to differ-
entiate his paper clip from prior inventions? and (3) Was the
paper clip a revolutionary or pioneering invention as opposed
to an evolutionary one? After these factual questions are
resolved, the court can use the jury's answers to construct a
hypothetical version of the claim limit and then return the
question to the jury for a determination of whether the
accused device infringes that limit.
Granted, this is necessarily a simplistic example; however,
the more sophisticated the patent, the more effectively a hypo-
thetical can be used by the litigants to assist the judiciary in
accurately defining the range of equivalents. This example
illustrates that the hypothetical can be expanded to take into
account not only the prior art, but also the prosecution history
and pioneering nature of the invention. Therefore, the neces-
sity of a judge or jury having to struggle to understand the
technology involved in the dispute is reduced. Because the liti-
gants must define with precision all of the relevant informa-
tion and provide an accommodating interpretation using a
hypothetical, flaws in that hypothetical are more likely to be
obvious.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's effort to facilitate the equitable pur-
poses underlying the doctrine of equivalents has created confu-
sion as the methods of application have changed. It is
necessary to define a single patent interpretation method that
provides for equitable patent construction and establishes a
reliable level of judicial certainty. This can best be achieved by
employing and expanding the hypothetical evaluation tech-
nique used in Wilson. This technique may be readily
expanded from merely considering prior art to also considering
prosecution history and the pioneering nature of the invention.
Using the hypothetical as a basis, the parties to the litigation
may avoid the difficulties in jury confusion about the technol-
ogy and rules at issue by having an adaptable presentation tool
that will narrowly focus the dispute. A more rigid and predict-
able framework for evaluating patents will result, yet that
result will not impair the judiciary's ability to render equitable
decisions.
Although some believe that the hypothetical is a beast to
fear like the multi-headed Hydra of Greek mythology,127 the
hypothetical is not a beast to be conquered as Hercules slayed
and burned each of the Hydra's nine heads; it is a beast to
serve as a vehicle for achieving justice. A better analogy for
the hypothetical would be to consider it like the Pegasus who
carried Bellerophon to smite the evil Chimera. 128 Pegasus is
like the hypothetical, Bellerophon represents the pursuit of
equity and the Chimera represents the confusion surrounding
the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
127. See Parker, supra note 52.
128. See THOMAS BULFINCH, THE AGE OF FABLE VOLUME ONE 126 (1913).
Bellerophon was a soldier sent by the gods to kill the Chimera, a fire breathing
creature with a lion's head, a goat's body, and a serpent's tail, who was wreaking
destruction on humanity. Bellerophon was allowed to fly on the back of the Pegasus,
and as they flew down upon the Chimera, the Pegasus' hooves struck the Chimera,
allowing Bellerophon to finish the Chimera off and save humanity.
